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ADAPTING THE ERW COMMUNITY
TO COMBAT IED THREATS
by Brad Alford and Michael Kennedy [ Janus Global Operations, LLC. ]

a distinctive branch of the wider EOD discipline. The practice is
often difficult and costly as it requires specialized equipment and
advanced training. The difficulty and ambiguity of the IEDD
tasks, along with the potential catastrophic consequences of
accidental detonations, have long made it an exclusive activity
for military or special police units. In recent years, the prevalence of the IED threat has resulted in IED awareness and
search skills training to the vast majority of personnel deployed
in conflict operations. Since an IED is considered a weapon
from combatants, organizations that conduct IEDD are faced
with similar security challenges as militaries and local police.
This integrated understanding of explosive hazards and their
operational impacts has reached ERW removal organizations.
This prompts the question: how can existing mine action organizations and personnel adapt to address this threat and effectively support stability operations?
IED charge fitted for anti-lift.
All photos courtesy of Janus Global Operations.
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ERW removal and mine action organizations have a wealth

n Iraq and other regions soon to be liberated from the

of experience operating in post-conflict areas to remove

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), recovery and

explosive hazards. Some organizations have categorized IEDs

stability efforts are hindered by improvised explosive

as a type of improvised landmine in order to catalogue and

devices (IED), which threaten civilians returning home and/

address it within the confines of their scope and mandates.

or assisting with reconstruction. According to Relief Web,

However, IEDs can vary greatly, even in the same opera-

the Anbar Provincial Council “discourage[d] the premature

tional theater. This variation can be in the form of a simple

return of internally displaced persons (IDP) to Fallujah due

pipe bomb used by ISIL as a hand grenade to a multi-switched

to the remaining IEDs left behind by the Islamic state of Iraq

device incorporating multiple main charges.

and al-Sham (ISIS) militants.” This threat, coupled with the

The battlefields of the 20th century were often open areas,

consequences of an asymmetrical conflict, has changed the

fought between traditional force-on-force opponents using

operating environments encountered by organizations that

conventional ordnance, which included mines that were

respond to explosive remnants of war (ERW). In order for

placed as both barrier obstacles, as well as nuisance mine-

post-conflict explosive hazard search and removal activities to

fields, targeting vulnerable points such as bridge abutments

stabilize these areas, organizations must be prepared to adapt

or landing strips. The vast majority of these mines were non-

to the dynamic and challenging environments that are associ-

electrical and recognized and approved render safe pro-

ated with improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD).

cedures (RSP). They were often placed in areas that could
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DISTINGUISHING MINE ACTION FROM IEDD

With origins seated in specialized military and police counter-

withstand a high order detonation, if demolition in situ was

terrorist explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, IEDD incor-

required. Due to the materials and methodology used in the

porates experience from a wide spectrum of conflicts and forms

creation of these devices, historical means of recognition and
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view IEDs as weapons, and disposing of these
weapons causes insurgents to react with hostility and see mine action organizations as
combatants. In Afghanistan, mine action organizations are advised to never destroy IEDs
and instead report them to local authorities
to avoid violent reactions from the Taliban.
Organizations that are conducting IEDD operations must adapt to this important risk and
provide the proper security and risk management from being targeted by insurgent groups.

Suicide IED belt found in Ramadi, Iraq.

the ability to reference technical publications to determine a
suitable RSP are less valuable. Not only have the means of disposal changed, but search procedures can differ when working with IEDs. For example, a road that might have a crush
wire IED will likely have a switch, which is difficult to detect
with traditional demining procedures unless search teams
are equipped with the training and equipment specific to IED
threats. These factors reduce the suitability for a traditional
demining approach and require the adaptation of new training and procedures, which are principally taken from recent
military experience.
ISIL and groups like the Taliban are now aware that nonmilitary actors will be used to search and clear areas after

LEARNING FROM EOD EXPERIENCE
Organizations involved in post-conflict ERW removal can
benefit from the experience of IEDD operators in approaching these items with philosophies and principals specific to
IEDs as opposed to mines. Traditional unexploded ordnance
(UXO) clearance operations relied heavily on technical publications of recognized RSPs for specific conventional ordnance
and military booby trap switches. Since each encountered IED
can vary greatly in terms of materials and deployment, the
traditional ERW RSPs counter the nature of the improvised
threat. Militaries adapted to this by adopting a philosophy of
approaching each IED as a unique threat and have applied this
in their training.

they were forced to withdraw. It serves their interest to make

IED RSPs do not always mirror UXO procedures. For exam-

clearance organizations’ tasks difficult. It is critical that orga-

ple, IEDD principles encourage standoff distances and devices

nizations understand that IEDs in liberated areas are still

such as remote control vehicles (RCV), unmanned aerial vehi-

serving ISIL’s purpose of harassing and restricting movement

cles (UAV), or hook and line kits to conduct circuit disrup-

through death or injury. Incorrectly categorizing all IEDs in

tion from a safe area. Additionally, due to the preponderance

liberated areas as abandoned or legacy devices or as simple

of electrically initiated IEDs, water-based disruptors are often

conventional mines creates further risk to life and property.

used to achieve neutralization. These can include improvised

When ISIL places IEDs in houses, schools, government build-

general emplaced disruptors made from water bottles and det-

ings, and other critical infrastructure points, they are actively

onating cord.

targeting the credibility of the local authority. The inability

Why conduct an RSP versus destruction? There might be

to dispose of these IEDs can adversely affect the confidence

opportunities to dispose of an IED in situ, where bulk explo-

that the local populace has in said authority. This can lead to

sives are used to cause a high order detonation of the device.

discontent, which can devolve into further violence. This has

Although this can be the safest and easiest option, destruc-

proven to be an effective Taliban tactic, technique, and pro-

tion in situ can present problems. Common obstacles include:

cedure (TTP) against the government of Afghanistan. The

the unavailability of explosives, potential damage to the sur-

Taliban has utilized IEDs to actively disrupt the government’s

rounding area, and unclear legal authorities to conduct high

ability to provide the fundamental services required to affirm

order detonations in the host country. Destruction of an IED

its authority.

in situ can also expose an operator to a viable device for lon-

Traditionally, most community-based ERW removal orga-

ger than necessary. For example, when dealing with a pres-

nizations were considered noncombatants. Community-

sure plate IED, if the IEDD operator intends to destroy it in

based mine action organizations in Afghanistan remove

situ, the operator needs to achieve intimate contact between

devices left behind from previous wars. The Taliban and ISIL

the IED’s main charge and an explosive donor charge (unless
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UXO scrap from a single sector at Al Anbar University, Iraq.

they have access to a shaped charge or large amount of bulk

devices, like those in Afghanistan, continue to utilize a simple

explosives). If the pressure plate is adjacent to or directly above

firing circuit with a normally open switch.

the main charge, the operator will need to spend a consider-

A key factor for organizations to consider during IEDD

able amount of time feeling for the main charge while in close

operations is that the batteries powering many IEDs have

proximity to the firing switch. The resultant explosion may

unusually long life spans. Many IEDs are designed to not

also interfere with other IEDs in the vicinity, thus increasing

draw any current from the IED’s power source. When com-

the hazard. Therefore, even if an IED can be destroyed in situ,

pared to the shorter life of a standard nine-volt battery in a

the operator might still elect to follow RSPs and disrupt the

house smoke alarm, ISIL devices may be viable for several

power source remotely or semi-remotely.

years after they are emplaced. The number of IEDs that have

DEFINE AND UNDERSTAND THE THREAT
The pressure plate IED (PPIED) became synonymous with
Afghanistan. Although the Taliban also deployed vast numbers of devices that were self-detonated, or detonated via radio
control or command wire, the PPIED often posed the greatest
challenge to Coalition Forces. Although many variants were
deployed, the general tactic was identical. The device was concealed and buried in the ground with a simple electrical circuit utilizing a firing switch created via two contacts held in
the open position by spacers. When the weight of the target is
applied to the pressure plate, the contacts come together, the
circuit completes, and the device detonates.
Previously in Iraq, PPIEDs were used on a small scale
against Coalition Forces. ISIL, however, has used PPIEDs and
other victim operated IEDs (VOIED) in vast quantities. These
have often been emplaced in a defensive manner in order to
restrict avenues of approach as the Iraqi Army begins their
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functioned in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq 8–10 months
after the area was liberated clearly demonstrates that batteries
contain enough voltage to detonate these devices.
ISIL has taken the effectiveness of pressure plate IEDs and
has sought to develop devices and tactics to further optimize
VOIEDs in the urban environment. As identified in Al Anbar
Province and other areas, ISIL made extensive use of a variety
of IED types in homes, schools, factories, and infrastructure
like water, power, and sewage plants. These include trip wires,
crush switches, hydraulic switches, anti-lift triggers, and a
variety of pull switches. The vast majority of these VOIEDs
normally employ an open firing switch that functions as a
result of a door being opened, an object being moved, or a person walking through a doorway. This again means that there
is no electrical draw of the power source and the device can
stay viable for an extensive period of time.
TRAIN FOR THE THREAT

offensive ground operations to liberate ISIL-controlled areas.

IED Search and Detect Operations. Training in open-

They often deployed PPIEDs in a manner similar to conven-

area, route, building, and infrastructure search and detect

tional barrier minefields, linking natural obstacles. These

(SnD) procedures is essential to meet the challenges posed in
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IED search operations at Al Anbar University, Iraq.

urban post-conflict zones. These procedures take a systematic

vetted and cleared by the local government before receiving

approach depending on the terrain and environment while

any IEDD training. The technical knowledge that is acquired

also assessing the intent and capability of the device user. This

through training is a restricted defense commodity, and it can

approach can vary considerably from the use of instruments

be exploited to create IEDs. Proper vetting and monitoring of

on un-prepared surfaces to utilizing visual checks in build-

employees by the IEDD organization and open communica-

ings and on prepared surfaces.

tion with the local authorities is vital to ensure that this tech-

A key difference between SnD and manual minefield clear-

nical knowledge is not given to insurgents.

ance is the adoption of IED threat assessment into planning

Risk Education. The need and scope for risk education is

the safest and most appropriate search procedure. For exam-

evolving, and it is critical that it be delivered in an effective

ple, the crush wire switch is difficult to detect both visually

and controlled manner. With vast numbers of residential,

and via search equipment. Instead, the adopted search proce-

commercial, and critical infrastructure buildings targeted by

dure should be focused on initially avoiding areas where the

groups like ISIL, risk education needs to be immediate. Large

crush wire switches are likely laid. Instead, the searcher locates

numbers of displaced persons are waiting for the fighting to

other components of the IED, such as the main charge. Once a

end before returning to their homes. Educating the returning

searcher detects a possible device, it is marked and reported to

populace to access their homes safely is required as search-

an IEDD operator for an RSP or disposal.

ing and clearing every house in an affected area is imprac-

IED Disposal Operations. IEDD-qualified staff need to

tical. However, this is not meant to replace IED search and

be conversant with both conventional ordnance and the

clearance by the recognized organization. If IEDs are deemed

full array of IEDs. As IEDs vary considerably, training must

highly likely or are confirmed, then the house, business, or

introduce the student to various devices instead of special-

area must be assigned by a coordinating body to an IEDD

izing in one specific device type. Detailed training in explo-

organization or local police with the capacity to implement

sive theory (including the use of homemade explosives),

SnD operations safely.

IEDD philosophies and principles, task scene management,

Equip to Meet the Challenge. At the conceptual level,

and threat assessment and execution all need to be covered

IEDD operations employ similar equipment as conventional

specific to IEDD. The current International Mine Action

EOD operations. However, the equipment needed for IEDD

Standards (IMAS) do not sufficiently prepare an operator for

operations is not only more advanced but can often be subject

the dynamic situations they will face in the field. A unique set

to export restrictions. Organizations must realize the limita-

of standards must be developed for IEDD.

tions of equipment designed to combat different threats and

Local personnel hired to aid and (eventually) assume the

must employ disruptors that can double as dearmers, hook

responsibility of IEDD in a post-conflict area must be properly

and line kits that are fit for purpose, and personal protective
ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016

19

equipment (PPE) that is sufficient for the task. Seeking alter-

ISIL has also developed an extensive range of projected

nate equipment as a means of circumnavigating problems

IEDs (from rockets and mortars to large improvised rocketed

posed by acquiring controlled equipment is dangerously irre-

assisted mortars). A large portion of these are direct copies of

sponsible. Without the proper equipment, the risk that opera-

conventional ordnance, incorporating cast-and-milled main

tors face is greatly increased.

bodies with homemade explosive fill and a detonating cord

An equipment area that is in need of further detailed con-

booster. The fuze is often an improvised copy of a military

sideration in the future is the use of mechanical clearance to

fuze, incorporating a plain detonator modified by the attach-

include tillers, flails, ploughs, and excavators. As with mechan-

ment of a percussion cartridge often taken from a 0.22 caliber

ical minefield clearance, these machines can be used to facili-

cartridge. All of these improvised munitions need to be han-

tate the rapid creation of a confirmed hazardous area, enabling

dled with care due to the unknown state of the explosive fill

the start of the search and clearance phase that will likely still

and functionality of any built-in safety features.

need to be conducted. IEDs that were encountered in Iraq have

The wide range of explosive threats present in Ramadi

typically had main charges with a net explosive weight (NEQ)

reinforces the need for comprehensive training and opera-

ranging from 10 to 20 kg (22 to 44 lb). The damage that these

tional approaches. Destruction of IED belts and pressure

charges would cause, even to armored and remotely operated

plates in situ is difficult due to the inability of acquiring

machines, severely limits their effective use. Whereas the use

adequate high order explosives. In Iraq, the only organiza-

of machinery has a place within IEDD, organizations need to

tion that can deliberately initiate a high order explosion is

carefully develop standard operating procedures (SOP) to uti-

the Iraqi Army. This scarcity of high order explosives com-

lize machines effectively.

bined with the need to prevent further damage to Ramadi’s
critical infrastructure necessitates RSPs. Each RSP is differ-

CASE STUDY: RAMADI, IRAQ
Janus commenced IEDD operations in Ramadi, Iraq, in
April 2016. Janus first established an operations base and
recruited local deminers to retrain as searchers. These personnel were trained in IED SnD as well as battlefield area
clearance (BAC). International technical advisors with IEDD

ent depending on how the device was emplaced and the individual situation that the operator encounters. It is critical to
ensure that the Iraqis are trained for this task as local capacity is built. SnD is more complex than destroying IEDs in
place in an open, permissive environment. They must master
the concepts of IEDD.

experience were employed to conduct training, mentoring,
and operational EOD/IEDD tasks. The challenges initially
faced by the project were similar to those often encountered by
ERW eradication organizations in the post-conflict environment. These included the requirement to build relationships
with local stakeholders and operating in an evolving situation
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FULL SND vs SURFACE BAC
Prior to deployment, Janus developed a SnD training package based around the anticipated IED threat. Once deployed,
these were further amended to take into account the significant number of non-pressure plate IEDs that were encoun-

with no clear tasking authority.

tered, such as crush wire IEDs, trip wires, and anti-lift

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS IN RAMADI

basic explosive theory, device component parts, land service

devices. Thus the courses developed for the students included

Explosive hazard threats from IEDs. ISIL employed a wide

ammunition recognition, search equipment, procedures, and

range of both conventional ordnance and IEDs. Therefore, in

individual search drills. Additional training was also pro-

addition to the requirement to clear significant quantities of

vided on BAC procedures, which proved to be a key element

Coalition and Iraqi Army UXO, the task of combatting ISIL’s

in increasing productivity when the threat of an active IED

IEDs was immense in scale and filled with many uncertainties.

could be discounted.

The majority of the United Nations Development Program’s

Combined SnD and BAC training creates a higher level of

initial priority tasks focused on searching and clearing critical

productivity in many cases. In one case, a large water treat-

infrastructure. Explosive hazards could range from a victim-

ment plant was occupied and cleared by the Iraqi Army with

operated crush-wire IED, to an improvised pipe bomb, to a

workers returning and starting operations at the site. Non-

conventional 81 mm mortar. In addition, large air-dropped

technical surveys and some technical surveys were conducted

munitions including numerous variants of 500 lb aircraft

in order to ensure that a surface BAC search could be safely

bombs were regularly encountered and posed a direct threat

conducted to locate conventional UXO and IED component

to the local population.

parts. This adaptability in operations enabled a site to be

FEATURE @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

completed in approximately two days when full SnD might

found. Educating the donor community about the highly spe-

take two weeks.

cialized personnel and equipment required to meet this mod-

STOCKPILE CLEARANCE AND EXPLOSIVE
HAZARD SPOT TASKS
After the Iraqi Army completed their ground assault of
Ramadi they started the process of clearing the city of some
of the IEDs left behind by ISIL. Often these were the devices
that were placed in roads and the most significant buildings, therefore representing an immediate threat to military
operations. These devices were then placed at the side of the
road and formed uncontrolled stockpiles. These roadside
stockpiles represented a significant explosive hazard. When
the local population and construction workers returned to
Ramadi without appropriate risk education, they started to
add items to these piles. These items required detailed IEDD/
EOD procedures to confirm that they were safe to move to a
central demolition site (CDS) for final disposal.
The management of the deliberate clearance of the stockpile needed to be coordinated with a range of local and international stakeholders in order to achieve an adequate security
cordon, evacuation of bystanders, and demolition. These

ern challenge effectively is an ongoing effort. We must accept
the realities of limited funding yet still appreciate the critical
importance that IEDD capacity brings immediately following
a conflict. When the work and sacrifice of government militaries concludes, the private sector and humanitarian actors need
to ensure that populations can safely re-inhabit liberated cities
and towns. Employing specifically tailored approaches to the
unique scourge of IEDs is fundamental to the ERW community and ultimately, the safety of civilians and operators alike.
The asymmetrical conflicts of the 21st century no longer
resemble the battlefields of the past. When ongoing conflicts
end, ERW organizations will be required to clear the path for
civilians returning to their homes. In order for these postconflict efforts to be successful, the ERW community must
evolve to counter these threats. The IEDs that are left after the
fighting ends in Iraq are testament to the modified tactics of
the terrorist organizations. ERW organizations must adopt
IEDD principles and practices in order for post-conflict
recovery to occur.
See endnotes page 66

stockpiles often represented an explosive hazard simply by
the unstable nature of the homemade explosives and lack of
basic explosive safety knowledge by the individuals that left
the ordnance. For example, an electrical power source could
be positioned adjacent to an electrical detonator that was
still attached to a 20 kg (44 lb) IED main charge, which if it
had functioned, could have detonated an additional 2,000 kg
(4,400 lb) of explosives.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
The use of IEDs by ISIL is immense and has changed the
face of what ERW response efforts will look like in the region
for some time. This threat shares characteristics with other
conflicts across the world including Afghanistan, Libya, Mali,
Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria. Acceptance of sound IEDD principals is the cornerstone for organizations to develop effective programs.
The environments in which organizations operate are
also likely to continue to become less defined with f luctuation in terms of stakeholders, armed groups, and the overall
security situation. Groups such as ISIL are becoming more
aware that after they leave an area, ERW organizations are
deployed to clear explosive hazards. These organizations
have become targets.
It is hard to quantify the lives saved and the utility provided
by IEDD in square meters cleared or the number of devices
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